Testing the "waterbed" effect in mobile telephony by Genakos, Christos & Valletti, Tommaso
  
 
 
 
CEP Discussion Paper No 827 
October 2007 
Testing the "Waterbed" Effect in Mobile Telephony 
Christos Genakos and Tommaso Valletti 
 
    
Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of regulatory intervention to cut termination rates of calls 
from fixed lines to mobile phones. Under quite general conditions of competition, theory 
suggests that lower termination charges will result in higher prices for mobile subscribers, a 
phenomenon known as the “waterbed” effect. The waterbed effect has long been 
hypothesized as a feature of many two-sided markets and especially the mobile network 
industry. Using a uniquely constructed panel of mobile operators’ prices and profit margins 
across more than twenty countries over six years, we document empirically the existence and 
magnitude of this effect. Our results suggest that the waterbed effect is strong, but not full. 
We also provide evidence that both competition and market saturation, but most importantly 
their interaction, affect the overall impact of the waterbed effect on prices. 
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1. Introduction 
Mobile termination charges4 have become the regulators’ focus of concern 
worldwide in recent years. Especially regarding the fixed-to-mobile termination rates, 
a large theoretical literature has demonstrated that independently of the intensity of 
competition for mobile customers, mobile operators have an incentive to set charges 
that will extract the largest possible surplus from fixed users.5 This competitive 
bottleneck problem provided justification for regulatory intervention to cut these 
rates. However, reducing the level of termination charges can potentially increase the 
level of prices for mobile subscribers, causing what is known as the “waterbed” 
effect. The main purpose of this paper is to examine the existence and magnitude of 
the waterbed effect in the mobile telephony industry. 
Both regulators and academics have recognized the possibility that this effect 
might be at work and be strong in practice. The first such debate started in 1997 in the 
UK with the original investigation by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (now 
Competition Commission).6 Another example is the New Zealand Commerce 
Commission which, in its 2005 investigation, initially took the position that mobile 
subscription prices would rise in response to a cut in termination rates only if mobile 
firms operated in a perfectly competitive environment. The Commission was 
subsequently convinced that the waterbed effect is a more general phenomenon, but 
there remained doubts about the importance of such an effect. The most recent 
termination rate proposals by the UK regulator Ofcom considered the issue of the 
waterbed in order to analyse the impact of regulation of call termination. Ofcom 
acknowledged the importance of the waterbed effect, but questioned whether the 
effect was “complete”, arguing that this can only be the case if the retail market is 
sufficiently competitive.7  
Yet, despite the importance of the waterbed effect for welfare calculations, no 
systematic evidence exists on its existence or magnitude. Casual empiricism suggests 
that mobile subscription prices have been decreasing quite steadily over time in 
                                                 
4 These are the charges mobile operators levy on either fixed network operators or other mobile 
operators for terminating calls on their networks. 
5 See, for example, Armstrong (2002), Wright (2002), Valletti and Houpis (2005) and Hausman and 
Wright (2006). Armstrong and Wright (2007) also provide an excellent overview of the mobile call 
termination theoretical literature and policy in the UK. 
6 The term “waterbed” was first coined by the late Prof. Paul Geroski, chairman of the Competition 
Commission in the UK, at the time of the first investigation on interconnection charges in the mobile 
industry. 
7 See “Mobile call termination, Proposals for consultation”, Ofcom, September 2006. 
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virtually every country, despite the regulation of mobile termination rates. At the 
same time, though, the industry has become more competitive, with additional entry, 
tougher competition, etc., exerting a countervailing force. As an example, Figure 1 
plots the evolution of subscription prices and termination rates in France. While 
termination rates have been cut steadily over the years, prices to medium user 
customers have remained more or less constant. Does this imply there is no waterbed 
effect? Not necessarily as competition in the industry might also have intensified and 
other trends, such as economies of scale due to growth in traffic volumes, may also 
mask the impact of the waterbed on subscription prices. 
 
[Figure 1] 
 
In this paper we analyze the impact of fixed-to-mobile termination rate regulation 
on prices and profit margins on a newly constructed dataset of mobile operators 
across more than twenty countries during the last decade. The timing of the 
introduction of regulated termination rates, but also the severity with which they were 
imposed across mobile firms, varied widely and has been driven by legal and 
institutional aspects of each country. Using quarterly frequency data and employing 
panel data techniques that control for unobserved time-invariant country-operator 
characteristics and general time trends, we are able to identify and quantify for the 
first time this waterbed effect. Our estimates suggest that although regulation reduced 
termination rates by about ten percent, this also led to a ten percent increase in mobile 
outgoing prices on average. This waterbed effect is shown to be robust to different 
variable definitions and datasets. 
However, although the waterbed is shown to be high, our analysis also provides 
evidence that it is not full: accounting measures of profits are positively related to 
MTR, thus mobile firms suffer from cuts in termination rates. Finally, our empirical 
analysis also reveals that both competition and market saturation, but most 
importantly their interaction, affect the overall impact of the waterbed effect on 
prices: the waterbed effect is stronger the more intense competition is in markets with 
high levels of market penetration and high termination rates. 
Our paper is related to an emerging literature on “two-sided” markets that studies 
how platforms set the structure of prices across the two sides of the business (see 
Armstrong, 2006, and Rochet and Tirole, 2006). Telecommunications networks are 
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examples of two-sided markets: providing communication services to their own 
customers over the same platform and providing connectivity to their customer base 
to other networks. The two markets are linked: more subscribers on the network 
means more opportunities for users of other networks to make calls. Whenever we 
look at two-sided markets, the structure of prices (i.e., who pays for what) is 
fundamentally important for the development of the market. In mobile telephony, 
typically it is only senders that pay (under the Calling Party Pays – CPP – system), 
while receivers do not. This is why termination rates are not the locus of competition 
and, if left unregulated, they will be set at the monopoly level.8 This is also a case 
where the mobile firms sell two goods with interdependent demand: at any given 
termination rate, the volume of fixed-to-mobile calls that an operator receives depend 
on the number of mobile subscribers on its network. In a sense, mobile subscribers 
and fixed-to-mobile calls are complements, as an increase in the number of 
subscribers will cause an increase in the volume of fixed-to-mobile calls.9 Our work 
therefore also contributes to the more general understanding of two-sided markets. 
Recent empirical works on two-sided markets include Rysman (2004, on yellow 
pages; 2007 on credit cards), Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2006, on newspapers), and 
Kaiser and Wright (2006, on magazines). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present two simple 
models, one under pure competition and one under pure monopoly, with the purpose 
of demonstrating that the waterbed effect is expected to arise under quite general 
conditions. Section 3 describes our empirical strategy and discusses the data used. 
Section 4 presents the main results on the waterbed effect. Section 5 discusses some 
dynamic aspects of the regulatory impact on prices. Section 6 analyzes how the level 
of competition and market penetration interact with the magnitude of the waterbed 
effect, together with some other extensions. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
                                                 
8 The U.S. is a noticeable exception in that there is both a RPP (receiving party pays) system in place 
and, in addition, termination rates on cellular networks are regulated at the same level as termination 
rates on fixed networks. The U.S. also has a system of geographic numbers that does not allow to 
distinguish between calls terminated on fixed or mobile networks. For these reasons, the U.S. is not 
included in our sample. Most of the mobile world is under a CPP system. 
9 It is important to be very careful with the use of standard definitions taken from normal “one-sided” 
markets. In this example, the notion of complementarity between mobile subscribers and fixed-to-
mobile calls is more controversial if one starts instead with a price increase of mobile termination. 
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2. Two simple models of the waterbed effect 
In this section we discuss two simple but related models that give rise to the 
waterbed effect. The first one is a perfect competition model, where the waterbed 
effect arises from the zero-profit condition. The second model analyzes a monopoly 
situation, where the waterbed effect arises via an increase in the ‘perceived’ marginal 
cost of each customer. The aim of this section is to show how the waterbed effect can 
emerge under a rather wide range of circumstances. 
First, let us make the simplified assumption that the mobile telephony market is 
characterized by perfect competition Also imagine each mobile network operator 
derives revenues from two possible sources:  
• Services to own customers: these would include subscription services and 
outgoing calls to customers in the same network, i.e., calls made by own 
subscribers. All these services are bundled together and cost P to the customer, 
i.e., P is the total customer’s bill. Let N be the total number of customers that 
an operator gets at a price P. 
• Incoming calls: these are calls received by own customers but made by 
customers of other networks. The total quantity of these calls is denoted by QI 
and the corresponding price received by the mobile operator (the MTR) is 
denoted by T and is regulated. 
For ease of exposition, we assume that all calls received are from fixed users.10 
Thus the demand for incoming calls to mobile subscribers coincides with the demand 
for (outgoing) fixed-to-mobile calls. The profit of the operator is: 
 
 { {
rents
nterminatiobill
)( ITQNcP +−=π  
 
where c denotes the total cost per customer (this cost includes the handset, and the 
cost of the bundle of calls and services offered to the customer), while there are no 
other costs from receiving and terminating calls. 
Since the industry is assumed to be perfectly competitive, each firm does not 
make any extra rent on any customer. The bill therefore is: 
 
                                                 
10 Calls from other mobile users could be easily accommodated in this framework. 
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where NTQI /=τ  is the termination rent per customer. In other words, under perfect 
competition any available termination rent is entirely passed on to the customer via a 
reduction in its bill. Since the overall profit does not change with the level of MTR (it 
is always zero), we can differentiate the zero-profit condition for the operator, leading 
to 
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now obtain an expression for the waterbed effect, expressed in elasticity terms as: 
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The elasticity of incoming calls εI is negative and likely to be less than 1 in 
absolute value.11 Also, εN < 0 and the termination rent is typically small compared to 
the overall cost per customer, so 1/λ = –c/τ + 1 < 0 too, and the overall sign of the 
RHS of equation (1) is negative, i.e., we should indeed expect a waterbed effect 
                                                 
11 In a previous version of this work, using detailed cross country information on fixed-to-mobile 
quantities data for Vodafone only, we estimated εI around -0.22. Recall once more that MTRs are 
regulated, otherwise a monopolist will set its price to the point where demand becomes elastic. 
Therefore, if left alone, the mobile operator would push up the MTR price and obtain higher 
termination rents. This elasticity refers to the demand for incoming calls from the point of view of the 
operator, when T is changed. The elasticity of fixed-to-mobile calls with respect to the end user price, 
PF, can be written as 
F
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εε === . Therefore, the elasticity with 
respect to the retail price is equal to the elasticity with respect to the MTR (εI), times a “dilution factor” 
PF/T and a “pass-through rate” dT/dPF. In the case of the UK, Ofcom have assessed a dilution factor of 
approximately 1.5 (see “Mobile call termination, Proposals for consultation”, Ofcom, September 
2006). Ofcom also believe that pass-through of the termination may be less than complete (i.e., dPF/dT 
< 1, or dT/dPF > 1), since BT’s price regulation applies to a whole basket of services. However, in 
other European countries the fixed network retention (PF – T) is itself directly regulated (e.g., the case 
in Belgium, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands). 
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involving a negative relationship between outgoing prices to mobile users and 
incoming termination prices.  
Equation (1) was derived under the assumption of a “full waterbed” since any 
termination rent is simply passed on to the customer. Hence, if there is a full 
waterbed, profits should not be affected by the level of T. Still, a full waterbed effect 
does not imply a straightforward magnitude of the elasticity εW. By inspection of (1), 
the elasticity of the waterbed effect could be above or below 1, in absolute value, 
depending on the relative sizes of (a) termination revenues relative to costs (τ vs. c, 
which determines the level of λ); and (b) price elasticities for subscriptions and 
incoming calls ( Nε  vs. Iε ). 
A similar argument can be made in the case of pure monopoly. Let N(P) denote 
the subscription demand for mobile services, driven as before by the total price P of 
the bundled mobile services. QI(N, NF, T) denotes the total amount of fixed-to-mobile 
calls, which is assumed to depend on the number of fixed users, number of mobile 
users, and the call price paid – directly affected by the termination charge. 
The monopolist maximises with respect to P: 
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The first-order condition gives: 
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or in elasticity terms: 
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where εΝ is the elasticity of subscription demand. In other words, the equation above 
is the classic inverse elasticity rule modified such that the “perceived” marginal cost 
C per customer also includes the termination rents (with a minus sign). Each time a 
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customer is attracted, it comes with a termination rent: the higher the rent, the lower 
the perceived marginal cost. If regulation cuts termination rents below the profit 
maximising level, this is ‘as if’ marginal costs increase, and as a consequence retail 
prices will increase as well. Hence, the waterbed phenomenon is also expected under 
monopoly. This increase in the perceived marginal cost exists with perfect 
competition as well. The only difference is that the elasticity of the waterbed effect 
under competition was obtained by differentiating the zero-budget constraint, while 
now it is derived by totally differentiating the monopolist’s first-order condition. 
To make some further inroads into the monopoly case, we assume that each fixed 
user calls each mobile user with the same per-customer demand function q(T), that is 
)(TqNNQ IFI = . Then (2) simplifies into 
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ε
τ 1
=
−− , 
 
where IF qTN=τ  is again the termination rent per mobile customer, with c > τ. 
Assuming a constant-elasticity demand for subscription, from (3) the elasticity of the 
waterbed effect is negative and given by: 
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which is very similar to the effect derived in (1) under perfect competition (although 
(1) is obtained from a binding zero-profit condition and not from the first-order 
condition). Similarly, to see the impact on total profits in equilibrium we can write: 
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We can decompose the elasticity of profits with respect to T (assuming a constant 
elasticity of subscription demand) into a “waterbed” effect and a “subscription” effect. 
Since the last effect is WNP
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which is positive as the monopolist will always set the price in the elastic portion of 
demand. Higher termination rates should be associated with higher profits to the 
extent that the firm enjoys substantial market power. 
Notice that our analysis so far focused on an “uncovered” market, in the sense that 
there is always some customer who does not buy any mobile service. This assumption 
may be called into question as in many countries penetration rates now exceed 100%. 
While this does not alter our analysis in the case of perfect competition, the monopoly 
example requires a further qualification. Instead of relying on the first order condition, 
a monopolist that wants to cover entirely a “saturated” market would choose a price P 
to satisfy the participation constraint of the customer with the lowest willingness to 
pay. In this limiting situation, a waterbed effect will not exist. 
In summary, we discussed how the waterbed effect would arise under the two 
extreme cases of perfect competition and monopoly. These simplified models, are 
admittedly unrealistic to describe the complex world of mobile telephony, but 
appealing as they generate the waterbed effect under very different assumptions. 
Mobile markets worldwide are dominated by a small number of firms. Competition 
among them is expected to be somewhere between the two extreme scenarios of 
perfect competition and monopoly. Under these more general (oligopolistic) market 
conditions, the same economic logic applies. We therefore expect the waterbed effect 
to be a robust phenomenon even after introducing complexities into the theoretical 
model that would make it a better and more realistic description of the industry. 
Hence, our main predictions that we bring to an empirical test are: 
1. A waterbed effect exists under quite general market conditions. Lower 
termination rates induced by regulation should be associated with higher retail 
prices to mobile customers. We also warned against a too simplistic 
interpretation of the waterbed price elasticities, since in general one should not 
expect a 1:1 effect even in a model with perfect competition, since demand 
elasticities and cost shares will have an impact too. 
2. For low levels of market penetration, the impact on retail prices, via the 
waterbed effect, exists independently from the level of competition. As far as 
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profits are concerned, when the industry is perfectly competitive, exogenous 
changes in termination rates have no impact on profits. On the other hand, 
when the industry is not competitive, profits are negatively affected by 
regulatory cuts in termination rates. 
3. For high levels of market penetration, we expect an increase in competition to 
make the waterbed effect stronger. The waterbed effect is always expected to 
be in operation under competition for any level of market penetration. 
However, in the limiting case when the market is fully covered, a monopolist 
sets its prices just to ensure that the last customer subscribes to the services, in 
which case termination rates have no impact on mobile retail prices. 
Therefore, when relating the magnitude of the waterbed effect to the intensity 
of competition, we will want to control for the market penetration in a given 
market, since this is a good proxy for subscription demand elasticity at 
different stages of the product life cycle of mobile telephony. 
 
3. Econometric Specification and Data  
3.1 Estimation Strategy 
Our empirical strategy is in two steps. In the first step, the analysis is based on the 
following regression equations: 
 
(5) lnPujct = αujc + αt + β1Regulationjct + εujct 
(5a) lnEBITDAjct = αjc + αt + β1Regulationjct + εjct 
 
The dependent variable in (5) is the logarithm of outgoing prices (lnPujct) for the 
usage profile u = {low, medium, high} of operator j in country c in quarter t. The 
dependent variable in (5a) is the logarithm of earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (lnEBITDAjct) of operator j in country c in quarter t. 
EBITDA is defined as the sum of operating income and depreciation and we use it as 
a proxy for profits. The main variable of interest, Regulationjct, is for the moment a 
binary indicator variable that takes the value one in the quarters when mobile 
termination rates are regulated.  
Both regressions constitute a difference-in-difference model, where countries that 
introduced the regulation are the “treated” group, while non-reforming countries 
(always regulated or always unregulated) are the “control” group. Due to the inclusion 
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of (usage-)country-operator and time fixed effects, the impact of regulation on prices 
(or profits) is identified from countries that introduced this regulation and measures 
the effect of regulation in reforming countries compared to the general evolution of 
prices or profits in non-reforming countries. The “waterbed” prediction is that, ceteris 
paribus, the coefficient on regulation should have a positive sign in (5), and a 
negative or zero effect in (5a) depending on whether the market is competitive or not.  
This difference-in-difference specification allows us to control for time-invariant 
country-operator characteristics that may influence both regulation and prices or 
profits. Furthermore, the specification also accounts for common global trends.  
One important concern regarding this difference-in-difference specification is that 
the unbiasedness of the estimator requires strict exogeneity of the regulation variable. 
For example, our results would be biased if countries and operators, which have 
witnessed slower decrease in prices (including fixed-to-mobile prices) than 
comparable countries, were more likely candidates for regulation. The direction of 
causation here would be reversed: because of high retail prices, then fixed-to-mobile 
termination rates are regulated. 
There are two ways we can address this concern. Firstly, according to theory, the 
intensity of competition should not matter as to whether or not to regulate MTRs. 
Unregulated MTRs are always “too high”, independently from the level of 
competition (though the level of competition might affect the optimal level of 
regulated MTR). In principle, therefore, we should expect every country to regulate 
MTRs sooner or later, which is indeed what we observe in the data. Secondly, what 
we observe empirically is the exact opposite of the above prediction. Figure 2 plots 
the average (time and usage-country-operator demeaned) prices in countries that have 
experienced a change in regulation, six quarters before and after the introduction of 
regulation. As we can see, compared to prices in the rest of the world, average prices 
in countries that experienced a change in regulation were actually lower before the 
introduction of regulation. Moreover, in line with our predictions, the introduction of 
regulation has a clear positive impact on prices (the waterbed effect) that becomes 
stronger as regulation becomes progressively more binding over time. Hence, 
classical reverse causality seems to be less of a concern in our context.12 
                                                 
12 In a related vein, we also checked growth rates of prices (again, time and usage-country-operator 
demeaned) in various groups of countries. Countries which experienced the introduction of regulation, 
did not show any significant variation in growth rates compared to countries which have been 
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[Figure 2] 
 
Most importantly for establishing causality, the regulation variable should be 
“random”. This (non-selectivity) assumption is quite restrictive because regulatory 
intervention does not occur randomly, but is the outcome of a long regulatory and 
political process. However, this process regarding mobile termination rates has been 
driven in practice by legal and institutional aspects. The UK has been at the forefront 
of this debate and started regulating MTRs already back in 1997. Other countries 
followed suit. Importantly, the European Commission introduced a New Regulatory 
Framework for electronic communications in 2002. The Commission defined mobile 
termination as a relevant market. Procedurally, every Member State (EU 15 at the 
time) was obliged to conduct a market analysis of that market and, to the extent that 
market failures were found, remedies would have to be introduced. Indeed, all the 
countries that completed the analysis did find problems with no single exception, and 
imposed (differential) cuts to MTRs (typically, substantial cuts to incumbents and 
either no cut or only mild cuts on entrants). Hence, the timing of the introduction of 
regulated termination rates, but also the severity with which they were imposed across 
mobile operators has been driven by this regulatory process and varied widely across 
countries with no systematic pattern. Finally, we also estimate a variant of (5) and 
(5a) allowing for flexible time-varying effects of regulation on prices (Laporte and 
Windmeijer, 2005) with the aim of distinguishing among any anticipation, short-run 
and long-run effects.  
Moreover, conditional on (usage-)country-operator and time fixed effects, the 
regulation variable should be uncorrelated with other time-varying factors. In other 
words, the main criticism of our framework is that we do not allow for joint country-
time fixed effects. A spurious correlation pointing towards a high waterbed would 
arise if, for example, a country is not regulated but is competitive and has low prices, 
while another country is regulated with low MTR but is also quite concentrated, so it 
has high prices: we attribute econometrically higher prices to the waterbed (via 
regulation), even if - in principle - the waterbed effect did not exist at all. While this 
                                                                                                                                            
unregulated throughout the period, before regulation was introduced. In contrast, growth rates of prices 
in countries which experienced the introduction of regulation were significantly different from growth 
rates of prices in countries unregulated throughout the period, after regulation was introduced. 
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may not be very plausible (typically, countries with low MTRs are also competitive, 
at least anecdotally, which should give rise to the opposite bias), it is important to 
bear in mind this caveat when interpreting our results. In addition, we tried to alleviate 
this data limitation problem as much as possible by splitting our sample of countries 
into three macro regions (Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Rest of the World) 
and introducing regional-time control variables. Despite this not being the ideal 
solution, our results become stronger, as we will demonstrate in the next section. 
A final consideration with the difference-in-difference estimators is that they 
exacerbate the downward bias in the standard errors arising from positive residual 
autocorrelation. Thus, following the solution proposed by Bertrand et al. (2004), all 
reported standard errors are based on a generalized White-like formula, allowing for 
(usage-)operator-country level clustered heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  
Before we discuss the various datasources, it should be stressed that using only a 
binary indicator for regulation is quite restrictive. It does not allow us to distinguish 
between countries that have introduced substantial price cuts in MTRs and countries 
that have regulated MTRs too but only mildly. For this reason, we also experiment 
with two other measures of the impact of regulation. 
In the spirit of Card and Kruger (1994), we construct two additional indexes. The 
first one is: 
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−=
regulated is  if 
dunregulate is  if 0
index 
jct
jct
jctct
jct
jct MTR
MTR
MTRMaxMTR
MTR
MaxMTR   
 
In other words, when the country is unregulated, the index takes a value of zero. If 
instead the country is regulated, we construct an index that takes larger values the 
more regulated a mobile operator is, compared to the operator that is regulated the 
least in the same country and period.  
This index takes advantage not only of the different timing of the introduction of 
regulation across countries, but also of the widespread variation on the rates imposed 
across operators within countries. This variation in regulated MTRs was particularly 
evident in countries where there was a large asymmetry between the “large” 
incumbents and the “small” entrants. While from a theoretical point of view the 
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“monopoly bottleneck” problem exists independently from the size of an operator, in 
practice, regulators have been more reluctant in cutting the MTRs of the new entrants. 
They did this most likely with the idea of helping entrants secure a stronger position 
in the market. Thus new entrants have been either unregulated for many periods 
(while the incumbents were regulated at the same time), or they have been regulated 
nominally but only very mildly, while much more substantial price cuts were imposed 
on the incumbents. Hence, in this index, the highest MTR within a country at every 
period becomes the benchmark for comparing how tough regulation has been on the 
rest of the firms.  
Our second regulation index is based on the same principle, but restricts the 
sample to only those countries for which we know with certainty that there is at least 
one fully unregulated operator. For example, UK was among the first countries to 
introduce termination rates regulation, but throughout this period mobile operator 3 
(Hutchison) was left completely unregulated. Thus, for the purposes of this index we 
use the termination rates that this firm was charging as a benchmark for all the other 
firms. This exercise severely restricts our sample size, but makes the identification 
even more transparent and exogenous. Hence, the second index is: 
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−=
regulated is  if 
dunregulate is  if 0
index 
jct
jct
jctct
jct
jct MTR
MTR
MTRdMTRUnregulate
MTR
dMTRUnregulate   
 
In other words, the index takes the value of zero when the country is unregulated. 
If instead the country is regulated, we construct an index comparing the rate each 
operator is regulated to the one charged by the unregulated firm in the same country 
and period. Both these indexes, allow us to get different measures of the severity of 
regulation in each country and period. 
Finally, in the second step, our analysis is based on the following instrumental 
variable regression models: 
 
(6) lnPujct = αujc + αt + β1ln(MTR)jct + εujct 
(6a) lnEBITDAjct = αjc + αt + β1ln(MTR)jct + εjct 
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The idea here is to estimate the waterbed effect on prices directly through the 
MTRs using regulation as an instrumental variable. Regulation is a valid instrument 
as it is not expected to influence prices other than the impact it induces via MTRs. 
This is because regulation acts on prices only indirectly via reducing MTRs, while 
regulators do not intervene in any other direct manner on customer prices. 
 
3.2 Data 
For the purpose of our analysis we matched three different data sources. Firstly, we 
use Cullen International to get information on mobile termination rates. Cullen 
International is considered the most reliable source for MTRs and collects all 
termination rates for official use of the European Commission. Using this source and 
various other industry and regulatory publications, we were also in a position to 
identify the dates in which regulation was introduced across countries and operators.  
Secondly, quarterly information on the total bills paid by consumers across 
operators and countries is obtained from Teligen. Teligen collects and compares all 
available tariffs of the two largest mobile operators for thirty OECD countries. It 
constructs three different consumer usage profiles (large, medium and low) based on 
the number of calls and messages, the average call length and the time and type of 
call. A distinction between pre-paid (pay-as-you-go) and post-paid (contract) is also 
accounted for. These consumer profiles are then held fixed when looking across 
countries and time. 
Thirdly, we use quarterly information taken from the Global Wireless Matrix of 
the investment bank Merrill Lynch (henceforth, ML). ML compiles basic operating 
metrics for mobile operators in forty-six countries. For our purposes, we use the 
reported average monthly revenue per user (ARPU) and the earnings margin before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). Through this source we also 
obtain information on market penetration and number of mobile operators in each 
country, together with the number of subscribers and their market shares for each 
operator. 
All consumer prices, termination rates and revenue data were converted to euros 
using the Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) currency conversions published by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to ease 
comparability. None of our results depends on this transformation. More detailed data 
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description, together with the dates of the introduction of regulation and summary 
statistics, can be found in the Appendix. 
The various datasources have different strengths and weaknesses regarding our 
empirical question. The Teligen dataset has two main advantages. First, by fixing a 
priori the calling profiles of customers, it provides us with information on the best 
choices of these customers across countries and time. Second, the prices reported in 
this dataset include much of the relevant information for this industry, such as 
inclusive minutes, quantity discounts etc. (although it does not include handset 
subsidies). However, this richness of information comes at the cost of having data for 
only the two biggest operators of every country at each point in time. For instance, if a 
country, such as the UK, had five mobile operators, possibly regulated differentially 
over time, only two observations per customer profile would be available. This 
reduces the variability and makes identification of our variables of interest harder, 
especially given that the biggest mobile operators are often regulated at the same rate. 
On the contrary, the ML dataset provides us with information on actual revenues 
rather than prices. The dependent variables that we use are primarily EBITDA (a 
measure of profit and cash flow) and ARPU (which consists of all revenues, including 
revenues from MTR). These are aggregate measures encompassing all revenues 
associated with mobile voice services. Therefore, they have to be interpreted as 
measures of an operator’s revenues and profitability rather than the total customer 
bill. Both these measures suffer from endogeneity problems which could introduce 
bias and inconsistency in our results. However, this dataset contains information on 
almost all mobile operators in each country and hence it allows us to exploit more 
within-country variation.  
 
4. Benchmark Results 
Table 1 reports our benchmark results from specification (5) using the price 
information from Teligen as the dependent variable. The data for this table consists of 
the best possible deals for each user profile among all possible contracts available, 
both pre-paid and post-paid.13 For that reason, we also add a binary variable (Pre-
                                                 
13 We will later check the robustness of our results if one constraints customers’ choices either to pre-
paid or monthly contracts. 
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paidjct) indicating whether the best deal was on a pre-paid contract or not.14 The 
estimated waterbed is 0.133 and strongly significant in column 1, where we utilize the 
simplest specification with a binary indicator for regulation. That means that the 
introduction of regulation of MTRs increased bills to customers by 13% on average. 
Notice that the coefficient on pre-paid is negative but insignificant, indicating that 
prices on the best pre-paid deals were no different than those on monthly contracts. 
In column 2, using the MaxMTR index we obtain again strong evidence of the 
waterbed effect. Similarly, in column 3 when we severely restrict our sample to only 
those countries we know with certainty they had at least one unregulated mobile 
operator, we still get a positive and significant effect.15 Notice also that the coefficient 
on pre-paid becomes now negative and significant, indicating that pre-paid customers 
were getting significantly better deals from the two main mobile operators when they 
were faced with an unregulated competitor. It seems likely that incumbents were 
offering significantly better deals to (the more elastic) pre-paid customers as a way of 
attracting consumers and putting pressure on the prices charged by their unregulated 
competitors.  
In the last two columns, for reasons already discussed in the previous section, we 
estimate an even more restrictive version of our model by allowing for regional-time 
fixed effects. Essentially, our sample of countries can be naturally divided into three 
macro regions: Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Rest of the World (Australia, 
New Zealand and Japan). Western European countries have been all subject to the 
New Regulatory Framework adopted by the European Commission, while other 
Eastern European countries have only recently been subject to regulation with the 
accession of new member States. Controlling for these regional effects in columns 4 
and 5, results in an even stronger waterbed effect, without reducing its statistical 
significance.16 
Next, we look at the impact of regulation on profitability measures using 
specification (5a). Table 2 reports the effect on EBITDA, while we relegate similar 
results on the impact on ARPU to the Appendix. Column 1 shows that regulation had 
                                                 
14 It is important to mention that the MTR is applied uniformly and does not distinguish, say, between 
calls to heavy users on contracts and calls to low users on prepaid. However, the waterbed price 
reaction of the mobile firm to changes in MTR can in principle differ by type of user or call, since their 
profile of received calls can differ, or the intensity of competition can differ by type of user too. 
15 The elasticities are not directly comparable as the regulatory variables have different mean values. 
16 We do not report the results of column 3 with the regional-country fixed effects because the Western 
Europe region binary indicator includes all the countries that had one operator being not regulated. 
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a negative effect on profit margins, although the data is considerably noisier. Using 
our two indexes, instead of the binary regulation variable (columns 2 and 3), reveal 
again a negative relationship, though the effect is not statistically significant. In 
columns 4 and 5, the inclusion of the regional-time fixed effects increases the 
magnitude of the coefficients without affecting much their statistical significance. If 
markets were fully competitive there should be no impact on profits. Thus, these 
results suggest that competitors seem to have some degree of market power. 
In our second step, using specifications (6) and (6a) we report the results from the 
IV regressions in Table 3. The first three columns use the same Teligen data as 
before, whereas the last three columns examine the effect on EBITDA. First stage 
results across all columns confirm that regulation has a significantly negative effect 
on MTR as expected. In addition, regulation does not seem to suffer from any weak-
instruments problems as indicated by the first stage F-tests. Column 1 shows that that 
regulation through MTR has indeed a negative and significant effect on prices. The 
magnitude of the elasticity of the waterbed effect is above 1.17 Over the period 
considered, regulation has cut MTR rates by 11% and, at the same time, has increased 
bills to mobile customers by 0.11 × 1.207 = 13.3%. 
The elasticity of the waterbed effect is lower at 0.938 and 0.334, in columns 2 and 
3 respectively, using the more sophisticated indexes of regulation, but still negative 
and highly significant. The effect on accounting profits is positive and significant in 
column 4, and positive but not significant with the more nuanced measures of 
regulation. Table 4 also provides evidence that the results remain unchanged and if 
anything become stronger, when we estimate the more restrictive version of our 
model that includes region-time fixed effects. 
We must remark that the ML dataset is probably less reliable than the Teligen 
dataset, so we take our conclusion on accounting profits more cautiously. In addition, 
all these results have to be qualified as termination rents could be also exhausted with 
non-price strategies, i.e., increasing advertising, or giving handset subsidies that we 
cannot control for. However, we do not expect handset subsidies effects to be too 
relevant, for instance, for pre-paid customers, and the test on EBITDA should take 
                                                 
17 Note that all the results in Tables 1 and 2 can be directly obtained from Table 3. The impact of 
regulation on prices, for instance, can be decomposed as
Regulation/
/Regulation/
∂∂
∂∂
=∂∂
MTR
MTRPP , 
where the denominator and the numerator and are obtained from the 1st and 2nd stage respectively in the 
IV regression. 
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these additional factors into account. If handset subsidies were linked to inter-
temporal subsidies (short-run losses are incurred to get long-run profits from captive 
customers), our results on profitability are, if anything, biased downwards. This is 
because a cut in MTR would look more profitable as fewer losses are made in the 
short run. Therefore our result on profitability would probably look stronger if we 
could account for handset subsidies.18 
Taken together these benchmark estimates confirm our theoretical intuition that 
there exists a strong and significant waterbed effect in mobile telephony. However, 
this effect is not full as competing firms seem to enjoy some degree of market power. 
 
[Tables 1, 2, 3, 4] 
 
5. Dynamic Regulation Effects 
The effect of regulation on prices might not be just instantaneous. On the one hand, 
termination rates are typically regulated over some periods using “glide paths”, in 
which charges are allowed to fall gradually towards a target over that period. The 
temporal adjustment path is known and anticipated by operators, at least before a new 
revision is conducted. On the other hand, there could also be some inertia. For 
instance, customers may be locked in with an operator for a certain period, therefore 
there would be no immediate need for mobile operators to adjust their prices as these 
customers would not be lost right away. Alternatively, when termination rates change, 
it may take some time for operators to adjust retail prices because of various “menu” 
costs. Hence, we would like to investigate whether firms anticipated regulation 
(possibly by trying to affect the outcomes of the regulatory process) and indeed 
whether the effect of regulation was short-lived or had any persistent long term 
effects. To quantify these dynamic effects of the waterbed phenomenon, we define 
binary indicators for twelve, non-overlapping, quarters around the introduction of 
                                                 
18 All our analysis is related to the regulation fixed-to-mobile termination rates and not to mobile-to-
mobile termination rates. This should not raise particular concerns in our analysis for two reasons. 
First, in many jurisdictions mobile-to-mobile rates are not regulated, a part from imposing reciprocity, 
and therefore cuts in fixed-to-mobile rates do not apply to other types of calls. Second, if for some 
reasons termination of both types of calls are regulated at the same level, theory says that a change in 
reciprocal mobile-to-mobile rates should have no obvious impact on profits and tariffs (just a re-
balancing in the various components of the customer’s bill). If firms compete in two-part tariffs, the 
impact of reciprocal access charges on profits and bills is neutral (see Armstrong, 1998, and Laffont et 
al., 1998). Thus we really interpret our empirical results as the impact of the regulation of fixed-to-
mobile termination rates on prices and profits. 
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regulation and a final binary variable isolating the long-run effect of regulation. Our 
specification is as follows: 
 
(7) lnPujct = αujc + αt + β1DT-6jct + β2DT-5jct + …+ β12DT+5jct + β13DT+6jct + εujct 
 
where DT-6jct = 1 in the sixth quarter before regulation, DT-5jct = 1 in the fifth quarter 
before regulation, and similarly for all other quarters until DT+6jct = 1 in the sixth 
quarter after regulation and in all subsequent quarters. Each binary indicator equals 
zero in all other quarters than those specified. Hence, the base period is the time 
before the introduction of regulation, excluding the anticipation period (i.e., seven 
quarters before regulation backwards). This approach accounts for probable 
anticipation effects (as captured by DT-6 to DT-1 binary indicators) as well as short 
(captured by DT to DT+5) and long run effects (captured by DT+6).19  
Figure 3 plots the regression coefficients on these binary indicators together with 
their 95% confidence interval. As expected, regulation has no effect on prices six to 
four quarters before the actual implementation. However, there is some small but 
statistically significant anticipation of the regulatory intervention three to one quarters 
before. As discussed before, for the large majority of countries regulation was 
preceded by a long consultation period between the regulator and the various mobile 
operators. Our results reveal that operators started adjusting their price schedules 
slightly upwards even before the actual implementation of the new termination rates.  
However, it is the actual implementation of the regulation that has the biggest 
impact on prices as revealed by the immediate increase on the coefficients after 
regulation. In other words, regulation is binding from the beginning and as it tightens 
up over time, the waterbed effect increases. As we can see in figure 3, regulation also 
seems to have a large and very significant long-run waterbed effect. The coefficient 
estimate on DT+6, which quantifies the effect of regulation on prices post the sixth 
quarter after its introduction, is strongly significant and implies a long run elasticity of 
the waterbed effect of 33%. Note that this coefficient is not directly comparable to the 
previous estimates of the waterbed effect, as it incorporates the effect not only of the 
introduction of regulation, but also of the progressive tightening of termination rates. 
                                                 
19 See Laporte and Windmeijer (2005) for a discussion of this approach. 
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What is crucial is that prices seem to respond continuously with every tightening of 
the rules giving rise to a waterbed phenomenon that is not a one-off event. 
 
 [Figure 3] 
 
6. Interaction with Competition and Further Evidence  
6.1 Competition and Market Penetration 
Having established that the waterbed effect exists and has a strong long run effect, 
we now want to investigate in greater detail how competition affects this 
phenomenon. Competition is obviously expected to have a direct impact on prices: the 
more competitive the market, the lower the prices to customers. Besides this effect, 
however, if termination rates are “high” (e.g., unregulated) or a substantial mark-up is 
allowed, competition is expected to have an additional impact via the waterbed effect: 
the more competitive the industry, the lower the prices will be, on top of the direct 
effect, as any termination rent will be passed on to the customers. As discussed in 
Section 2, a waterbed effect is expected to exist also under monopoly, though the 
effect is milder as some rents will be kept by the monopolist. However, the waterbed 
effect is not expected to be very relevant under monopoly when the market is very 
saturated and the monopolist still has an interest in covering it. Hence, in our 
empirical specification it is crucial to control for subscription penetration levels. Our 
specification reads: 
  
(8) lnPujct = αujc + αt + β1ln(MTR)jct + β2ln(Competitors)ct + β3ln(Penetration)ct + 
γ1[ln(ΜTR)jct×ln(Competitors)ct] + γ2[ln(ΜTR)jct×ln(Penetration)ct] + 
γ3[ln(Penetration)ct×ln(Competitors)ct] + 
δ[ln(ΜTR)jct×ln(Competitors)ct×ln(Penetration)ct] + εujct 
 
Equation (8) is an extension of our previous specification (6) with the aim to 
specify a particular channel that might affect the intensity of the waterbed effect. Our 
proxy for the intensity of competition is simply the number of rival firms 
(Competitorsct) in each country and period. The number of mobile operators in a 
country can be taken as exogenous as the number of licences is determined by 
spectrum availability. Over the period considered, several countries have witnessed 
the release of additional licences. The degree of market saturation/maturity is 
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measured as the percentage of the population with a mobile phone (Penetrationct). Our 
main coefficient of interest is δ, where MTR is interacted both with the intensity of 
competition and with the degree of market saturation. 
Results are reported in Table 5. Column 1 is the baseline waterbed effect, 
comparable to that of column 1 in Table 3, restricted to the sample of firms and 
countries for which we have information on all these variables. Column 2 shows that 
a larger number of competing firms exerts the expected negative impact on prices. In 
column 3,20 the coefficient on the interaction between the competition variable and 
MTR is positive but insignificant, whereas in column 421 when we introduce all 
interaction terms, this coefficient becomes positive but barely significant.  
As we discuss in our theoretical section, the effect of competition on termination 
rates would differ depending on the level of market saturation and for that reason in 
column 522 we introduce our preferred specification which includes this triple 
interaction term. Our coefficient of interest, δ, is negative and strongly significant 
indicating that the waterbed effect is stronger the more intense competition is in 
markets with high levels of market penetration and high termination rates. This result 
is in line with our theoretical predictions where we pointed out the need to control for 
penetration levels when comparing competitive markets with concentrated ones. 
Notice that the direct waterbed effect still exists in all markets, as β1 is negative 
and very significant. The rest of the coefficients are also reassuring. We find that 
competition has a strong, negative direct impact on prices, besides any waterbed 
effect (β2 = -0.344) and that prices are also systematically lower in more mature 
markets (β3 = -3.228). When MTR is simply interacted with competition, not 
controlling for penetration levels, there is no statistically significant relationship.  
We also find a positive and significant coefficient on the simple interaction 
between MTR and saturation (γ2 = 1.422) and on the interaction between the number 
of competitors and market saturation (γ3 = 2.346). Although these coefficients are not 
our main focus, a couple of comments are in place. A positive coefficient on γ2 
                                                 
20 The instruments used for this specification are: regulation, interactions of regulation with the other 
exogenous variables (namely competitors and penetration), the number of own products for each 
mobile operator in the market (to capture the intensity of competition in the product space, a la Berry et 
al. 1995) and interactions of the residuals (from the regression: MTR on competitors, penetration, 
regulation and all the fixed effects) with competitors and penetration (Wooldridge, 2002). 
21 The instruments used are the same as in the previous column 3. 
22 The instruments used are the same as in the previous column 4 with the addition of the triple 
interaction of the residuals (from the regression mentioned in fn 20) with competitors and penetration. 
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indicates that the waterbed effect is lower in higher penetration markets. Intuitively, 
low penetration markets usually consist of heavy users for whom the waterbed effect 
is expected to be strong. But as the market becomes more saturated, this typically 
involves attracting marginal users who make and receive very few calls. Hence, we 
expect the waterbed effect to decrease as the market becomes more saturated because 
of the different types of consumers that are drawn into the mobile customer pool. On 
the contrary, we have no prior expectations on the coefficient γ3 as there is no strong 
reason to believe that, controlling for the number of competitors, the impact of 
competition should be more or less intense as the market saturates. On the one hand, a 
negative coefficient would arise if operators become less capacity constrained and 
compete more fiercely. On the other hand, if operators in mature markets tend to 
collude more easily over time, the result would be a positive coefficient. 
Finally, in column 6, where we use as an instrument the MaxMTR index instead of 
the binary variable Regulation,23 we confirm the conclusions previously drawn. 
Results are virtually unaffected for the majority of the coefficients, with the direct 
waterbed effect (β1) and the coefficient on the triple interaction (δ) becoming even 
stronger. 
Therefore, in line with our theoretical predictions, our empirical analysis reveals 
that both competition and market saturation, but most importantly their interaction, 
affects the overall impact of the waterbed effect on prices. We also experimented 
using the HHI index instead of the simple number of competing operators, as a 
different measure of competition. While the δ coefficient is still significant and has 
the expected sign (now the coefficient is positive, as an increase in HHI means a 
lessening of competition), some other results are less stable (see Table A10 in the 
Appendix). In our opinion, this reveals the limitations of our dataset (although HHI is 
potentially an alternative measure of competition, it clearly suffers from a more 
serious endogeneity problem than the number of competitors as discussed above) and 
of our reduced-form methodology regarding the effect of market structure on the 
waterbed phenomenon. Future research using a structural approach and more detailed 
country-level data is required to further understand these mechanisms. 
 
[Table 5] 
                                                 
23 The rest of the instruments used are the same as in column 5. 
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6.2 Waterbed Effect on Different Customer Types 
In all our previous specifications using the Teligen data, we assumed that a 
customer could ideally choose the best available contracts at any given point in time, 
given her/his usage profile. The results are therefore valid if indeed customers behave 
in this frictionless way. The introduction of mobile number portability24 certainly 
makes this possibility all the more realistic. However, as many market analysts 
advocate, there are good reasons to believe that distinguishing between pre-paid (pay-
as-you-go) and post-paid (long-term contract) customers is still important. Customers 
on long-term contracts may be looking only at similar long-term deals, and may not 
be interested in a temporary pre-paid subscription, even if this turned out to be 
cheaper for a while. Switching among operators takes time and for a business user this 
might not be a very realistic option, even in the presence of number portability. 
Conversely, customers on pre-paid cards, may have budget constraints and do not 
want to commit to long-term contracts where they would have to pay a fixed monthly 
fee for one or more years. Again, these customers may want to look only at offers 
among pre-paid contracts. 
Using our benchmark specification (5), we investigate whether there is a 
difference in the waterbed effect between pre-paid and post-paid users, when each 
type of user is limited in her/his choices within the same type of contracts. Tables A8 
and A9 (in the Appendix) report the results. Rather intriguingly, we find that pre-paid 
customers essentially are unaffected by regulation, whereas monthly subscribers bear 
the bulk of the price increases. This may arise because firms have a more secure 
relationship with monthly contract subscribers (who tend to stay with the same 
operator for several years), and so have a greater expectation of receiving future 
incoming revenues as a result of competing on price for these customers. Post-pay 
customers also tend to receive more incoming calls, and so become more (less) 
profitable as termination rates rise (fall). On the contrary, pre-pay subscribers, who 
are typically very price sensitive, tend to change their number often, therefore it is less 
likely that their numbers are known by potential callers.25 Thus pre-pay users receive 
                                                 
24 Mobile number portability is the ability of consumers to switch among mobile operators while 
keeping the same phone number. 
25 Vodafone, for example, reports the following churn rates across its major European markets for the 
quarter to 30 September 2006 (Source: Vodafone): 
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relatively few calls and a change in MTR has a much lower expected impact 
compared to post-pay customers. A further factor may be that network operators have 
a preference to change fixed fees in non-linear contracts rather than pre-pay call price 
structures which are closer to linear prices. 
The relationship between regulation and prices might not be monotonic and for 
that reason we examine as before the dynamic waterbed effects using our 
specification in (7) separately for pre- and post-paid deals. Figures 4 and 5 plot the 
regression coefficients on the thirteen binary indicators around the introduction of 
regulation together with their 95% confidence interval for pre-paid and post-paid 
contracts respectively. In line with our previous analysis, the anticipation of 
regulation has very little impact on either pre- or post-paid contracts up to two periods 
before regulation. Monthly customers (figure 5) then experience a change similar to 
that analysed with the general unconstrained results. On the contrary, the pattern for 
pre-paid contracts is more intriguing. As can be seen in figure 4, the inaction before 
the introduction of regulation is followed by a short-lived (for periods T and T+1) 
non-significant decrease in prices and then a continuous non-significant increase in 
prices for the next four quarters (periods T+2, T+3, T+4 and T+5). There is, however, 
an overall positive and strongly significant long-run waterbed effect (coefficient on 
T+6, around 27%) on these prices too.  
Notice also the massive increase in the variance associated with these coefficients 
after the introduction of regulation. Mobile operators seem to have reacted 
differentially regarding the pricing of these contracts shortly after the introduction of 
regulation. At the beginning, they seem on average to reduce the prices charged to 
these customers, possibly trying to lure customers into their networks (with the hope 
of them upgrading later to monthly subscribers) or potentially as a loss making, short 
term strategy against smaller firms that either remained unregulated or were not 
regulated at the same rates. In either case, the strong and positive long-run coefficient 
illustrates that mobile operators eventually were forced to abandon any such strategies 
                                                                                                                                            
Markets Prepaid Contract Total 
Germany 29.5% 13.5% 22.1% 
Italy 22.4% 13.6% 21.7% 
Spain 62.5% 13.4% 37.0% 
UK 49.9% 18.8% 37.6% 
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and raise the prices even for the pre-paid customers, which is another manifestation of 
the power of the waterbed effect. 
 
[Figures 4, 5] 
 
7. Conclusions 
Regulation of fixed-to-mobile termination charges has become increasingly 
prevalent around the world during the last decade. A large theoretical literature has 
demonstrated that independently of the intensity of competition for mobile customers, 
mobile operators have an incentive to set charges that will extract the largest possible 
surplus from fixed users. This competitive bottleneck problem provided scope for the 
(possibly) welfare-improving regulatory intervention. However, reducing the level of 
termination charges can potentially increase the level of prices for mobile subscribers, 
the so called “waterbed” effect. 
In this paper we provide the first econometric evidence that the introduction of 
regulation resulted to a ten percent waterbed effect on average. However, although the 
waterbed effect is high, our analysis also provides evidence that it is not full: 
accounting measures of profits are positively related to MTR, thus mobile firms suffer 
from cuts in termination rates. Finally, our empirical analysis also reveals that the 
waterbed effect is stronger the more intense competition is in markets with high levels 
of market penetration and high termination rates. 
Our findings have three important implications. First, mobile telephony exhibits 
features typical of two-sided markets. The market for subscription and outgoing 
services is closely interlinked to the market for termination of incoming calls. 
Therefore, any antitrust or regulatory analysis must take these linkages into account 
either at the stage of market definition or market analysis. 
Second, any welfare analysis of regulation of termination rates cannot ignore the 
presence of the waterbed effect. Clearly, if the demand for mobile subscription was 
very inelastic, the socially optimal MTR would be the cost of termination (though the 
regulation of MTR would impact on the distribution of consumer surplus among fixed 
and mobile subscribers). If, instead, the mobile market was not saturated and still 
growing there would be a great need to calibrate carefully the optimal MTR. We 
acknowledge that this calibration exercise is very difficult and must be done with 
great caution. It is therefore all the more important that further analysis and effort are 
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put to understand the behaviour of marginal users that might give up their handsets 
when the waterbed effect is fully at work. 
Third, our analysis on the existence and magnitude of the waterbed effect is also 
relevant in the current debate of regulation of international roaming charges. The 
European Commission has voted in 2007 to cap “roaming charges”26 of making and 
receiving phone calls within the EU. The aim is to reduce the cost of making a mobile 
phone calls while abroad and hence encourage more overseas (but within EU) phone 
use. Hence, a reduction in roaming charges may cause a similar waterbed 
phenomenon, whereby prices of domestic calls may increase as operators seek to 
compensate for their lost revenue elsewhere. While the magnitude of the waterbed 
effect caused by this new legislation is debatable, our results demonstrate that 
regulators have to acknowledge its existence and carefully account for it in their 
welfare calculations. 
Future research should concentrate on two aspects that we consider to be the 
limitations of this paper. On the one hand, more detailed information would allow 
researchers to overcome our data limitations. Having price data on a larger number of 
mobile operators within countries, would allow for joint country-time fixed effects to 
be properly controlled for in the empirical specification. Furthermore, to investigate 
the marginal consumer’s behaviour before and after the introduction of regulation and 
their elasticity regarding the waterbed effect, more detailed consumer-level 
information is required. On the other hand, given the non-linear retail price schedules 
and the complex incentives schemes (handsets, personal vs. business buyers’ 
contracts, etc.) provided by mobile operators, more detailed customer information at a 
country level would allow us to model more satisfactorily the effect of competition 
and market penetration on the waterbed effect. Such a structural model would also 
enable us to quantify the effects of various regulatory interventions and their welfare 
implications. We intend to pursue both avenues in our future research. 
 
                                                 
26 These are the charges made to customers when using their phones outside their home country, i.e., an 
Italian customer making/receiving a phone call in Greece. 
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5. Appendix 
5. 1 Data description 
To test the waterbed effect we use a variety of different sources. Regarding the mobile 
termination rates, we use the biannual data provided by Vodafone using Cullen 
International and its own internal sources. The variable identifies those periods in 
which the MTRs of network operators were constrained by a formal decision taken by 
a national regulatory authority. Because all the other datasets used are in quarterly 
format, we extrapolate the mobile termination rates where necessary to get the same 
frequency. 
For firms’ prices we use two data sources. Teligen (2002Q3-2006Q1) reports 
quarterly information on the total bills paid by consumers across countries. The 
second dataset is the Global Wireless Matrix of Merrill Lynch. This data is available 
also on a quarterly basis (2000Q1-2005Q3). For our purposes, we use the reported 
average revenue per user (ARPU) and the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation 
and amortization (EBITDA). ARPU is calculated by dividing total revenues by 
subscribers. EBITDA is defined as the sum of operating income and depreciation and 
is used to proxy for profit and cash flow. 
Variables are described in Table A1. Table A2 gives summary statistics for the 
Teligen dataset (and the matched MTRs), while Table A4 gives summary statistics for 
Merill Lynch (and the matched MTRs). Tables A3 and A5 correspond to Tables A2 
and A4 respectively, but limited to the sample we use when we analyze the effect of 
competition, and also include the additional variables used in that exercise. Table A6 
reports all the starting dates of regulation in countries which adopted MTR regulation. 
 
[Tables A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6] 
 
5.2 Additional results 
Impact on ARPU. In the main text (Section 3.1) we considered the impact of MTR 
on EBITDA, taken as a measure of profitability. Alternatively, one can also use 
ARPU (we recall that this measure also includes termination revenues, and therefore 
cannot be taken as a measure of customers’ prices). Results are shown in Table A7. In 
line with the results on EBITDA, we find that higher MTRs have a somehow positive 
effect on ARPU, though the results are not significant when we include regional-time 
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dummies. Taken together with the results on EBITDA, we have some evidence that 
the waterbed effect is not full. 
 
Pre- and post-paid contracts. Table A8 and A9 reports the results discussed in 
Section 6.2. They are the equivalent to Table 1, split between pre-paid deals (A8) and 
monthly post-paid contracts (A9). The procedure and interpretation is the same as 
with Table 1. 
 
Competition. Table A10 reports the results from the first-stage regression of Table 5 
(section 6.1). Table A11 reports the full set of results of the impact of competition, 
using the HHI index of market concentration instead of the number of competitors as 
a proxy for the intensity of competition in the market.  
 
[Tables A7, A8, A9, A10, A11] 
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Figure 1 
Average price and MTR decline (France, Medium User) 
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
20
02
Q3
20
02
Q4
20
03
Q1
20
03
Q2
20
03
Q3
20
03
Q4
20
04
Q1
20
04
Q2
20
04
Q3
20
04
Q4
20
05
Q1
20
05
Q2
20
05
Q3
20
05
Q4
20
06
Q1
priceppp
mtrppp
 
Notes: Figure 1 presents normalized (at the beginning of the period) PPP-adjusted average prices (total bill 
paid by medium usage consumers) and MTR rates for France based on the Teligen and Cullen International 
dataset.  
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Figure 2 
Average Price around the introduction of Regulation 
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Notes: Figure 2 plots the evolution of time and country-operator-usage demeaned average logarithm of the 
PPP adjusted price paid per usage profile six quarters before and after the introduction of regulation of fixed-
to-mobile termination charges based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every 
period.  
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Figure 3 
The Evolution of the Waterbed Effect 
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Notes: Figure 3 plots the regression coefficients on binary variables six quarters before and after the 
introduction of regulation. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the PPP adjusted total bill paid by 
consumers with different usage based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every 
period. All equations include country-operator-usage and a full set of time dummies. Standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form and clustered by country-operator-
usage. 
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Figure 4 
The Evolution of the Waterbed Effect (Pre-Paid) 
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Notes: Figure 4 plots the regression coefficients on binary variables six quarters before and after the introduction 
of regulation. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with 
different usage based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available to pre-paid customers at every 
period. All equations include country-operator-usage and a full set of time dummies. Standard errors are adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form and clustered by country-operator-usage. 
 
Figure 5 
The Evolution of the Waterbed Effect (Monthly Subscription) 
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Notes: As Figure 4, but based on the best deals available for monthly subscribers at every period. 
TABLE 1 – ESTIMATING THE “WATERBED” EFFECT  
(TELIGEN) 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent variable lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct 
Regulationjct 
0.133***
(0.033)  
   
0.152*** 
(0.033)  
 
MaxMTR indexjct  
0.290*** 
(0.068) 
 
  
0.316*** 
(0.066) 
UnregulatedMTR indexjct   
0.127** 
(0.051)   
Pre-paidjct 
-0.045 
(0.040) 
-0.051 
(0.041) 
-0.127*** 
(0.044) 
-0.052 
(0.039) 
-0.056 
(0.040) 
Observations 1734 1734 450 1734 1734 
Country-Operator-Usage 150 150 36 150 150 
Within-R2 0.220 0.234 0.367 0.252 0.267 
 Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage 
based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every period. All equations include country-
operator-usage and a full set of time dummies (first three columns) or a full set of region-time dummies (last two 
columns). All countries in the sample were divided into three macro regions: Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Rest 
of the World (RoW); see text for more details. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of 
unknown form and clustered by country-operator-usage are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 
10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 – ESTIMATING THE “WATERBED” EFFECT  
(MERRILL LYNCH) 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent variable lnEBITDAjct lnEBITDAjct lnEBITDAjct lnEBITDAjct lnEBITDAjct 
Regulationjct 
-0.125* 
(0.070)  
  -0.138* 
(0.076)  
 
MaxMTR indexjct  
-0.024 
(0.133)   
-0.054 
(0.139) 
UnregulatedMTR indexjct   
-0.148 
(0.236)   
Observations 1135 1135 319 1135 1135 
Country-Operator 67 67 16 67 67 
Within-R2 0.209 0.203 0.281 0.215 0.209 
 Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the EBITDA from the Merrill Lynch dataset. All equations include country-operator and a 
full set of time dummies (first three columns) or a full set of region-time dummies (last two columns). All countries in the sample were divided 
into three macro regions: Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Rest of the World (RoW); see text for more details. Standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form and clustered by country-operator are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 
 
 TABLE 3 – WATERBED EFFECT THROUGH MTR 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimation method IV IV IV IV IV IV 
Dependent variable lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnEBITDAjct lnEBITDAjct lnEBITDAjct 
ln(MTR)jct 
-1.207*** 
(0.411)   
1.127* 
(0.603)   
MaxMTR indexjct  
-0.938*** 
(0.278)   
0.070 
(0.392)  
UnregulatedMTR 
indexjct 
  -0.334** (0.133)   
0.620 
(0.862) 
1st Stage Coef. -0.110*** (0.024) 
-0.310*** 
(0.035) 
-0.382*** 
(0.028) 
-0.111*** 
(0.037) 
-0.335*** 
(0.051) 
-0.239** 
(0.098) 
1st Stage R2 0.044 0.127 0.523 0.045 0.112 0.137 
1st Stage F-test 21.83*** [0.000] 
78.85*** 
[0.000] 
188.24*** 
[0.000] 
8.90*** 
[0.004] 
43.88*** 
[0.000] 
5.90** 
[0.028] 
Observations 1734 1734 450 1135 1135 319 
Clusters 150 150 36 67 67 16 
Notes: Columns 1, 2 and 3 utilize the Teligen data as in Table 1. The dependent variable for these columns is the logarithm of the PPP adjusted 
total bill paid by consumers with different usage for the best deals available. Columns 4, 5 and 6 utilize the Merrill Lynch dataset as in Table 2. 
The dependent variable for these columns is the logarithm of the EBITDA. All regressions use the “Regulation” dummy as the instrumental 
variable. All equations include either country-operator-usage (Teligen) or country-operator (Merrill Lynch) and a full set of time dummies. P-
values for diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form and 
clustered by either country-operator-usage (Teligen) or country-operator (Merrill Lynch) are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 
 
TABLE 4 – WATERBED EFFECT THROUGH MTR (Regional-Time Controls) 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimation method IV IV IV IV 
Dependent variable lnPujct lnPujct lnEBITDAjct lnEBITDAjct 
ln(MTR)jct 
-1.529*** 
(0.496)  
1.415* 
(0.757)  
MaxMTR indexjct  
-1.076*** 
(0.283)  
0.187 
(0.473) 
1st Stage Coef. -0.100*** (0.023) 
-0.294*** 
(0.032) 
-0.098** 
(0.038) 
-0.288*** 
(0.052) 
1st Stage R2 0.038 0.123 0.040 0.097 
1st Stage F-test 18.15*** [0.000] 
85.18*** 
[0.000] 
6.47** 
[0.013] 
30.43*** 
[0.000] 
Observations 1734 1734 1135 1135 
Clusters 150 150 67 67 
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 utilize the Teligen data as in Table 1. The dependent variable for these columns is 
the logarithm of the PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage for the best deals 
available. Columns 3 and 4 utilize the Merrill Lynch dataset as in Table 2. The dependent variable for these 
columns is the logarithm of the EBITDA. All regressions use the “Regulation” dummy as the instrumental 
variable. All equations include either country-operator-usage (Teligen) or country-operator (Merrill Lynch) 
and a full set of region-time dummies. All countries in the sample were divided into three macro regions: 
Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Rest of the World (RoW); see text for more details. P-values for 
diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation of unknown form and clustered by either country-operator-usage (Teligen) or country-
operator (Merrill Lynch) are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant 
at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 
TABLE 5 – COMPETITION AND WATERBED EFFECT  
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimation method IV IV GMM GMM GMM GMM 
Dependent variable lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct 
ln(MTR)jct 
-1.580** 
(0.587) 
-1.282** 
(0.525) 
-0.733** 
(0.285) 
-0.775*** 
(0.235) 
-0.585*** 
(0.223) 
-1.026*** 
(0.220) 
ln(competitors)ct  
-0.289* 
(0.173) 
-0.473*** 
(0.180) 
-0.522*** 
(0.178) 
-0.344** 
(0.173) 
-0.339* 
(0.188) 
ln(mkt penetration)ct  
-0.768 
(0.483) 
-0.533 
(0.371) 
-1.785*** 
(0.563) 
-3.228*** 
(0.840) 
-3.707*** 
(0.882) 
ln(MTR)jct× ln(competitors)ct   
0.093 
(0.097) 
0.168* 
(0.087) 
0.098 
(0.083) 
0.117 
(0.086) 
ln(MTR)jct× ln(mkt penetration)ct    
0.168 
(0.141) 
1.422*** 
(0.364) 
1.792*** 
(0.413) 
ln(competitors)ct× ln(mkt penetration)ct    
0.962** 
(0.441) 
2.346*** 
(0.557) 
2.527*** 
(0.587) 
ln(MTR)jct× ln(competitors)ct× ln(mkt penetration)ct     
-0.895*** 
(0.248) 
-1.191*** 
(0.293) 
∆P/∆competitors  -1.282 -0.304 -0.345 -0.263 -0.176 
∆P/∆MTR  -0.289 -0.614 -0.583 -0.498 -0.914 
∆P/∆mkt penetration  -0.768 -0.533 -0.256 0.269 0.007 
Observations 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 
Clusters 141 141 141 141 141 141 
Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions -  
- 
 
4.244 
[0.374] 
4.418 
[0.220] 
6.071 
[0.108] 
3.654 
[0.301] 
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage for the best deals available from the Teligen data. All equations include 
country-operator-usage and a full set of time dummies. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown 
form and clustered by country-operator-usage are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 
 
  
APPENDIX 
 
 
TABLE A1 – VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS  
Pujct 
total price paid (PPP adjusted euros/year) per usage 
profile (usage profiles: high, medium and low) 
 
MTRjct 
mobile termination rate (PPP adjusted eurocents/minute) 
 
ARPUjct 
monthly average revenue per user (PPP adjusted 
euros/month) 
 
EBITDAjct 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization margin (%) 
 
 Notes: The first variable is constructed using the Teligen dataset, the second variable is taken 
from the Cullen International dataset and the last two variables are from the Merrill Lynch 
dataset. 
 
 
TABLE A2 – SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Teligen Table 1 (Best Overall Deals) 
lnPujct 1734 5.203 1.708 0.107 7.492 
ln(MTR)jct 1734 1.800 1.656 -3.246 3.573 
Regulationjct 1734 0.614 0.487 0 1 
MaxMTR indexjct 1734 0.163 0.237 0 1.127 
UnregulatedMTR indexjct 450 0.150 0.291 -0.137 1.127 
Pre-paidjct 1734 0.324 0.468 0 1 
Teligen Table 2 (Pre-Paid Best Deals) 
lnPujct 1686 5.556 1.680 0.114 7.989 
ln(MTR)jct 1686 1.883 1.574 -3.246 3.573 
Regulationjct 1686 0.603 0.489 0 1 
MaxMTR indexjct 1686 0.167 0.239 0 1.127 
UnregulatedMTR indexjct 450 0.150 0.291 -0.137 1.127 
Teligen Table 3 (Monthly Subscription Best Deals) 
lnPujct 1734 5.292 1.695 0.107 7.728 
ln(MTR)jct 1734 1.800 1.656 -3.246 3.573 
Regulationjct 1734 0.614 0.487 0 1 
MaxMTR indexjct 1734 0.163 0.237 0 1.127 
UnregulatedMTR indexjct 450 0.150 0.291 -0.137 1.127 
  
 
TABLE A3 – SUMMARY STATISTICS  
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Teligen Table 1 (Best Overall Deals) 
lnPujct 1371 5.239 1.727 0.107 7.492 
ln(MTR)jct 1371 1.809 1.694 -3.246 3.573 
Regulationjct 1371 0.626 0.484 0 1 
ln(competitors)ct 1371 1.273 0.299 0.693 1.946 
ln(mkt penetration)ct 1371 -0.132 0.153 -0.601 0.167 
 
 
 
TABLE A4 – SUMMARY STATISTICS  
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
lnEBITDAjct 1135 -1.213 0.530 -4.605 -0.545 
ln(MTR)jct 1135 1.980 1.830 -3.246 3.934 
Regulationjct 1135 0.560 0.497 0 1 
MaxMTR indexjct 1135 0.115 0.203 0 1.127 
UnregulatedMTR indexjct 319 0.090 0.236 -0.137 1.127 
lnARPUjct 1247 3.481 0.242 2.592 4.431 
ln(MTR)jct 1247 2.046 1.785 -3.246 3.934 
Regulationjct 1247 0.541 0.498 0 1 
MaxMTR indexjct 1247 0.105 0.197 0 1.127 
UnregulatedMTR indexjct 357 0.080 0.225 -0.137 1.127 
 
 
TABLE A5 – SUMMARY STATISTICS  
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
lnEBITDAjct 1135 -1.213 0.530 -4.605 -0.545 
ln(MTR)jct 1135 1.980 1.830 -3.246 3.934 
Regulationjct 1135 0.560 0.497 0 1 
ln(competitors)ct 1135 1.305 0.298 0.693 1.946 
ln(mkt penetration)ct 1135 -0.243 0.229 -1.053 0.167 
 
 
TABLE A6 – REGULATION CHRONOLOGY 
  
Country Year 
Australia 2005 
Austria 2000 
Belgium 1999 
Czech Republic 2005 
Denmark 2001 
France 2004 
Germany 2005 
Greece 2006 
Hungary 2002 
Ireland 2006 
Italy 2000 
Japan 2000 
Luxembourg 2006 
Netherlands 2006 
New Zealand 2006 
Norway 2001 
Poland 1997 
Portugal 2003 
Slovak Republic 2005 
Spain 2000 
Sweden 2001 
Switzerland 2005 
Turkey 2006 
UK 1998 
 
TABLE A7 – ESTIMATING THE “WATERBED” EFFECT 
(MERRILL LYNCH) 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent variable lnARPUjct lnARPUjct lnARPUjct lnARPUjct lnARPUjct 
Regulationjct 
-0.020 
(0.024)  
  -0.027 
(0.024)  
 
MaxMTR indexjct  
0.084* 
(0.045)   
0.067 
(0.046) 
UnregulatedMTR indexjct   
0.088** 
(0.042)   
Observations 1247 1247 357 1247 1247 
Country-Operator 74 74 18 74 74 
Within-R2 0.300 0.306 0.408 0.335 0.336 
 Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the PPP adjusted ARPU from the Merrill Lynch dataset. All equations include country-
operator and a full set of time dummies (first three columns) or a full set of region-time dummies (last two columns). All countries in the 
sample were divided into three macro regions: Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Rest of the World (RoW); see text for more details. 
Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form and clustered by country-operator are reported in 
parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
TABLE A8 – ESTIMATING THE “WATERBED” EFFECT  
(TELIGEN Pre-Paid) 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent variable lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct 
Regulationjct 
0.008 
(0.057)  
   
0.014 
(0.058)  
 
MaxMTR indexjct  
0.154 
(0.103) 
 
  
0.165 
(0.103) 
UnregulatedMTR indexjct   
0.006 
(0.104)   
Observations 1686 1686 450 1686 1686 
Country-Operator-Usage 147 147 36 147 147 
Within-R2 0.131 0.139 0.258 0.141 0.150 
 Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage 
based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available to pre-paid customers at every period. All equations 
include country-operator-usage and a full set of time dummies (first three columns) or a full set of region-time 
dummies (last two columns). All countries in the sample were divided into three macro regions: Western Europe, 
Eastern Europe and Rest of the World (RoW); see text for more details. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation of unknown form and clustered by country-operator-usage are reported in parenthesis below 
coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 
 
TABLE A9 – ESTIMATING THE “WATERBED” EFFECT  
(TELIGEN Monthly Subscription) 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent variable lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct 
Regulationjct 
0.137***
(0.032)  
   
0.158*** 
(0.032)  
 
MaxMTR indexjct  
0.318*** 
(0.066) 
 
  
0.343*** 
(0.064) 
UnregulatedMTR indexjct   
0.152** 
(0.056)   
Observations 1734 1734 450 1734 1734 
Country-Operator-Usage 150 150 36 150 150 
Within-R2 0.238 0.256 0.393 0.252 0.291 
 Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage 
based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available for monthly subscribers at every period. All 
equations include country-operator-usage and a full set of time dummies (first three columns) or a full set of region-
time dummies (last two columns). All countries in the sample were divided into three macro regions: Western Europe, 
Eastern Europe and Rest of the World (RoW); see text for more details. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation of unknown form and clustered by country-operator-usage are reported in parenthesis below 
coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 
TABLE A10 – COMPETITION AND WATERBED EFFECT - First Stage Results 
ln(MTR)jct       
1st Stage R2 0.025 0.035 0.120 0.120 0.254 0.277 
1st Stage F-test 19.92*** [0.000] 
19.30*** 
[0.000] 
15.44*** 
[0.000] 
15.09*** 
[0.000] 
48.47*** 
[0.000] 
33.85*** 
[0.000] 
ln(MTR)jct× ln(competitors)ct       
1st Stage R2   0.375 0.373 0.984 0.516 
1st Stage F-test   73.06*** [0.000] 
89.02*** 
[0.000] 
6825.55*** 
[0.000] 
112.21*** 
[0.000] 
ln(MTR)jct× ln(mkt penetration)ct       
1st Stage R2    0.976 0.481 0.983 
1st Stage F-test    1738.28*** [0.000] 
133.06*** 
[0.000] 
13641.36*** 
[0.000] 
ln(MTR)jct× ln(competitors)ct× ln(mkt penetration)ct       
1st Stage R2     0.984 0.984 
1st Stage F-test     11110.71*** [0.000] 
7314.96*** 
[0.000] 
 
TABLE A11 – COMPETITION AND WATERBED EFFECT  
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation method GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
Dependent variable lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct lnPujct 
ln(MTR)jct 
-1.137*** 
(0.325) 
12.091** 
(5.440) 
11.535** 
(5.769) 
23.545*** 
(5.202) 
28.008*** 
(7.483) 
ln(HHI)ct 
0.122 
(0.609) 
3.673** 
(1.620) 
5.295*** 
(1.743) 
8.038*** 
(1.745) 
7.563*** 
(2.059) 
ln(mkt penetration)ct 
-0.760** 
(0.301) 
-0.466 
(0.366) 
16.351** 
(7.188) 
60.167*** 
(15.656) 
81.523*** 
(25.825) 
ln(MTR)jct× ln(HHI)ct  
-1.703** 
(0.692) 
-1.422** 
(0.709) 
-2.937*** 
(0.644) 
-3.645*** 
(0.963) 
ln(MTR)jct× ln(mkt penetration)ct   
0.445*** 
(0.144) 
-15.912** 
(6.206) 
-31.221*** 
(11.434) 
ln(HHI)ct × ln(mkt penetration)ct   
-2.013** 
(0.851) 
-7.240*** 
(1.882) 
-9.791*** 
(3.091) 
ln(MTR)jct× ln(HHI)ct × ln(mkt penetration)ct    
1.957*** 
(0.752) 
3.780*** 
(1.372) 
∆P/∆HHI 0.122 0.593 2.989 3.215 1.360 
∆P/∆MTR -1.137 -1.882 -0.191 -0.570 -1.876 
Observations 1371 1371 1371 1371 1371 
Clusters 141 141 141 141 141 
Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions 13.737 [0.003] 
8.397 
[0.015] 
13.904 
[0.008] 
9.434 
[0.093] 
10.336 
[0.066] 
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different usage for the best deals available from the Teligen data. 
All equations include country-operator-usage and a full set of time dummies. P-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets and italics. Standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form and clustered by country-operator-usage are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
 
TABLE A11 – COMPETITION AND WATERBED EFFECT - First Stage Results 
ln(MTR)jct      
1st Stage R2 0.107 0.107 0.163 0.341 0.355 
1st Stage F-test 7.73*** [0.000] 
7.73*** 
[0.000] 
18.43*** 
[0.000] 
45.08*** 
[0.000] 
43.20*** 
[0.000] 
ln(HHI)ct      
1st Stage R2 0.237 0.237 0.391 0.518 0.521 
1st Stage F-test 27.23*** [0.000] 
27.23*** 
[0.000] 
57.57*** 
[0.000] 
49.15*** 
[0.000] 
52.36*** 
[0.000] 
ln(MTR)jct× ln(HHI)ct      
1st Stage R2  0.109 0.162 0.327 0.337 
1st Stage F-test  7.40*** [0.000] 
15.22*** 
[0.000] 
37.22*** 
[0.000] 
39.96*** 
[0.000] 
ln(MTR)jct× ln(mkt penetration)ct      
1st Stage R2   0.977 0.984 0.983 
1st Stage F-test   2136.18*** [0.000] 
8892.52*** 
[0.000] 
10577.14*** 
[0.000] 
ln(HHI)ct × ln(mkt penetration)ct      
1st Stage R2   0.954 0.964 0.964 
1st Stage F-test   316.84*** [0.000] 
2353.59*** 
[0.000] 
1975.01*** 
[0.000] 
ln(MTR)jct× ln(HHI)ct × ln(mkt penetration)ct      
1st Stage R2    0.982 0.982 
1st Stage F-test    6607.09*** [0.000] 
7718.04*** 
[0.000] 
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